Cura Religionis or Two Kingdoms: The Late Luther on Religion
and the State in the Lectures on Genesis1
Whitford, David M
March 1, 2004
Church History, Volume 73; Issue 1; ISSN: 00096407
In 1996, Bernhard Lohse wondered if the Luther presented
by some would recognize the Luther described by others.2 Trying
to recognize the "political" Luther would be especially
difficult. On the one hand, Thomas Muntzer was but the first
in a long line of polemicists, journalists, politicians, and
scholars who have accused Luther of releasing the sword of
secular authority from all control and thereby opening up
centuries of authoritarian subjugation.3 On the other hand,
Peter Frarin argued in 1566 that Protestantism equaled sedition,
rebellion, and the subversion of civil order.4 In the criticism
of Luther for being either too conservative or too liberal,
one thing remained fairly constant: the source of Luther's
major shortcoming-his theology of the Two Kingdoms.5
Recently, however, Luther's commitment to the Two Kingdoms
has been called into question. James Estes has argued that
beginning in 1530, Luther began to abandon the Two Kingdoms
in favor of the more traditional idea of the cura religionis
as advanced by his close associate and friend Philip Melanchthon.6
Melanchthon argued that the community was a Christian commonwealth
and that the magistrate had a responsibility, as the custodian
of both tables of the Law, to regulate the right order of
true religion.7 Traditionally, Luther has been understood
as having rejected the cura religionis in favor of his own
dialectical doctrine of the Two Kingdoms in which the magistrate
has certain functions and the church has other functions.
Both are essential and complementary, but necessarily distinct.
While it has often been argued that beginning in 1530 Luther
began to reinterpret his Two Kingdoms doctrine to allow for
a greater role in religion by civil authorities, Estes argues
that Luther did not just reach different conclusions regarding
the effect and interpretation of the Two Kingdoms, but that
he largely abandoned it in favor of Melanchthon's understanding
of the cura religionis.8 This essay assesses the validity
of such a shift by examining Luther's Lectures on Genesis.
The Lectures on Genesis provide an excellent resource for
this reassessment because Genesis lends itself to discussions
of law, sin, government, and authority.9 Further, the Genesis
Lectures come at the end of Luther's career and therefore
provide an excellent window of comparison between the commitments
of the "young" Luther (who is universally regarded
as having rejected the idea of a cura religionis) and the
"mature" Luther.10 This reassessment is important
because there are few areas in Luther's thought that have
been as heavily criticized and critiqued as his understanding
of the Two Kingdoms, secular authority, and religious freedom.
Luther used two terms when speaking of the Two Kingdoms.11
The first ought to be referred to as the Two Realms (Zwei
Reiche Lehre) because it refers to the two spheres of one's
existence: before God and before humanity. The geistliche
Reich (the spiritual realm) is one's existence cor am deo
(before God). The weltliche Reich (the worldly realm) refers
to one's existence coram hominibus (before humanity). The
spiritual realm is eternal and everlasting; it is the realm
of the Gospel, revelation, and faith. Two motifs run through
Luther's thought about the spiritual realm: freedom and equality.
Freedom allows one to act in service for the benefit of others.
Equality asserts that the spiritual realm is not governed
hierarchically. In this realm all Christians are equal. Whereas
the spiritual realm is eternal and proleptic, the secular
is finite and fleeting. Here law and convention instead of
service are definitive; it is the realm of reason and unbelief.
Contained within these Two Realms is Luther's idea of Two
Governments (Zwei Regimente Lehre). The Two Governments are
the flip side of the coin to the Two Realms. The first (das
geistliche Regiment) is the spiritual government of the church
exercised through the proclamation of the Word of God and
proper administration of the sacraments. The second (das weltliche
Regiment) is the worldly government of emperors, rulers, and
ruled, which is governed by law and enforced by coercion.
The responsibility of the secular realm is to limit the effects
of sin and malfeasance and thus to ensure that the unjust
will not run rampant over the weak and downtrodden.12
Thus, Luther attempted in the 152Os to set a new course
in the relationship between the church and the state. Instead
of one being the subject of the other, they would each have
clearly defined roles and spheres of influence that must be
kept distinct.13 To investigate Luther's commitment to the
Two Kingdoms, we shall look for the consistent use of these
themes in the Lectures on Genesis. We shall begin with his
understanding of authority and government, for it is in Genesis,
Luther argues, that human authority is established. The proper
definition of authority is a cornerstone of the Two Kingdoms.
If Luther fails to remain consistent here to the principles
regarding authority he set forth in the 152Os, then he has
indeed abandoned the Two Kingdoms in favor of the cura religionis.
Second, as an extension of the examination of authority,
we must explore the dual nature of authority. In 1526, Luther
boasted that "not since the time of the apostles have
the temporal sword and authority been so clearly described
or so highly praised as by me."14 Now we must ask whether
in praising it so highly, he gave it more authority than was
warranted. all authority, for Luther, is derived from God.
Thus, other authorities receive their sanction from God as
well. Fathers, Burghermeisters, and princes are ordained by
God for the maintenance of good and are thus due obedience
(Romans 13:1-7). However, it is also divided between the secular
and the spiritual. In the 1520s, Luther was very clear that
the two should be neither confused nor combined. Collapsing
the kingdoms and therefore advocating a landesherrliche Kirchenregiment
in the Lectures on Genesis would clearly substantiate the
claim of a transition to the cura religionis.
Finally, we must examine Luther's understanding of Law and
Gospel. The Genesis lectures are ideal for this purpose, not
simply because it is in Genesis that Luther discusses the
implications of the Fall, but because it is here in Genesis
that Luther finds the Gospel proclaimed in its pristine, prelapsarian
form. The Law and Gospel are a central dialectic in Luther's
thought.15 Luther notes two proper uses of the Law: the natural/civil/or
political use and the theological. The Law in its political
sense is a good gift of God in that it limits human sin and
avarice and thus promotes the common good. Theologically,
the Law reveals the utter uselessness and futility of salvation
by works.16 Thus he rejects the ethical and moral approaches
to God (and their attendant social/political structures).
In their place, Luther offers God's promise of salvation given
freely in the Gospel of Jesus Christ.17
I. AUTHORITY IN THE LECTURES ON GENESIS
Luther uses the phrases authority, government, or power
of the sword repeatedly throughout the Lectures on Genesis;
however, it is in reference to two pericopes that he offers
his most detailed exploration of the subject. The first time
he touches with any depth on the issue of authority is in
Genesis 2:16-17. Genesis 2 is the second telling of the creation
story and has as its focus the creation of Adam and Eve in
the Garden. In verses 16 and 17, God commands Adam and Eve,
"Eat from every tree in Paradise, but from the tree of
the knowledge of good and evil do not eat." For Luther
the pronouncement of this edict signals the institution of
authority within the human community by establishing the authority
of the church and the home. The church is brought into being
by the proclamation of the Word (that is, the edict) to Adam.
The authority of the home is established because Adam alone
hears this Word and must then communicate it to Eve; thus
husbands instruct their wives.
Absent from this prelapsarian institution of authority is
any sense of restriction, punishment, or chastisement that
attend authority after the Fall. In a sense, here, we see
only the edifying use of authority:
Adam had need of this command concerning the tree of knowledge
of good and evil; namely, [so that] there should be an outward
form of worship and an outward work of obedience toward God.
. . . Who, then, is either so ignorant or so deranged as to
conclude from this that no Law was given to Adam when he hears
it stated that Adam was righteous? For nothing else follows
from this than that the Law given to the unrighteous is not
the same Law that was given to righteous Adam. Moreover, when
a Law is given to righteous Adam, it follows that this is
a different Law from the one which later was given to the
unrighteous.18
The law "do not eat" provides Adam and Eve with
parameters in which to live and serves to guide them in right
living and the right worship of God.19 Thus, for Luther, authority
is part of God's original plan for creation. Creation is to
have order and direction; however, there is no need of the
convicting aspect of the law (its first use) or of the political
use of the law as a deterrent to crime (its second use). These
aspects only become essential to life after the Fall.
For Luther, the effects of the Fall are devastating in their
totality. The imago Dei is shattered, and from then on, humanity
is bound to sin. As an alleviation to this depraved state,
God offers the law: now experienced, however, as judgment,
conviction, and punishment. Once sin enters the picture, the
aspect of the law as edifying fades into the background before
its first two uses. In Genesis 9, Luther turns to examine
these aspects of authority.
Genesis 9 records the postdeluge covenant between God and
Noah. God begins by pledging, "never again to destroy
all living creatures" and then commands Noah and his
family to be "fruitful and multiply." Because homicide
threatens the latter command and flaunts the former promise,
God further commands that those who take human life must give
their own as punishment. For Luther, the imposition of the
death penalty signals the establishment of the political use
of the law (that is, the institution of governmental authority):
"Here we have the source from which stem all civil law
and the law of nations. If God grants to man power over life
and death, surely he also grants power over what is less,
such as property, the home, wife, children, servants, and
fields. All these God wants to be subject to the power of
certain human beings, in order that they may punish the guilty."20
Had there been no Fall, there would be no murder or sin, and
thus there would have been no need for government.21 All of
government's activity flows from its authority to wield the
sword in order to punish the wicked. This understanding of
governmental proper authority is wholly consistent with the
"early" Luther. Throughout his life Luther understood
the role of government to be a gift from God as "an outward
remedy" to sin.22
Soon after Luther addressed the establishment of temporal
authority, he turns to discuss its proper use by way of exegeting
an example of its flagrant abuse. He uses the story of Nimrod
as a backdrop for this discussion. Nimrod is the son of Cush
and is portrayed in Genesis 10 as a great hunter and the founder
of the Babylonian empire.23 Luther uses Nimrod as an example
of authoritarian avarice, for "Nimrod was the first after
the flood to strive for the sovereignty of the world."24
Nimrod seeks his own glory and thus becomes the first postdeluge
tyrant. He does so by overthrowing his brothers and cousins
and usurping their authority. For Luther the most significant
aspect of this usurpation is Nimrod's rebellion against Shem.25
As the father of the Semite peoples, Shem is the embodiment
of God's priesthood. When Luther looks at Nimrod he sees many
of his contemporaries; that is to say, men who are unsatisfied
with what they have and seek to grab what does not belong
to them: "Not satisfied with his tyranny in the state,
he also wants to be lord in the church. He sets up new forms
of worship, and he oppresses those who stand before God. Moses
clearly distinguishes how a thing appears before God from
how it appears before men. What is good and righteous before
God the world always regards as evil and unrighteous."26
In the Lectures on Genesis, the essential nature of tyranny
is the inappropriate meddling of one kingdom (the prince-Nimrod)
in the other (the church-Shem).27 This usurpation is especially
troubling to Luther because it jeopardizes not just the lives
of its victims but their very souls. For this tyrant, "does
not hunt hares, deer, or boars, as the hunters do; but he
lies in wait for the righteous, the holy, the prophets, and
the priests of God. He hunts, traps, and kills those who are
dear to God, who have faith, and in whom God Himself dwells
through His Spirit."28 The danger of mixing the two kingdoms
is that it confuses Law and Gospel.
The theme of Law and Gospel recurs throughout the Genesis
Lectures. However, Luther chooses the story of Jacob's blessing
of Joseph's second son Ephraim rather than the first-born
Manasseh in Genesis 48:17(29) for his most detailed exegesis
of the topic. What is important about this story is that both
men are "very spiritual men"; neither is a tyrant
or an ally of the devil. Both are good, upright, God-fearing
men, and yet the disagreement between them is great. How is
such a situation possible, for this is not the first time
it has occurred; Abraham disagreed with Sarah and Isaac disagreed
with Rebecca. The answer lies in the distinction between the
Law and Gospel, for in each case of disagreement one participant
sides with human law, tradition, and natural right while the
other places his or her trust in God's promise.
God promised to make of Abraham a great nation. Prematurely,
Abraham sought to accomplish this through his servant Hagar.
Thus, Ishmael was Abraham's first-born son, and Abraham sought
to bless him. Sarah, however, denied the legitimacy of Ishmael
and advocated for her son, Isaac. Choosing Ishmael represents
tradition (for legally Abraham was right and Sarah was not);
Isaac represents God's promise that was, incidentally, made
to both Abraham and Sarah. Likewise, Isaac and Joseph both
seek the bestowal of blessing on their eldest sons (Esau and
Manasseh, respectively). Luther finds much to praise in the
actions of Abraham, Isaac, and Joseph. Human tradition and
custom have much to offer and should not be cast aside:
The doctrine of the Law should be retained because it is
necessary for the preservation of discipline. Therefore the
Law should be kept very rigidly, just as Abraham upholds Ishmael,
Joseph upholds Manasseh, etc. For the Law must not be cast
aside because of the promise of grace; but it must be taught
in order that discipline and the doctrine concerning good
works may be retained, and in order that we may be instructed
to know and humble ourselves after we have sinned. This is
the true and necessary use of the Law. For in this life we
need government and parents, who uphold discipline by means
of rewards and punishments and who keep the Law and govern
and direct their conduct in a godly and prudent manner according
to the norm of the Law.30
Thus law has a powerful and fruitful role to play in human
affairs, but its authority is not absolute. It is counterweighted
by the Gospel.31
Human tradition advocates primogeniture, "but the divine
blessing prefers the other son." The Gospel comes contrary
to our expectations. It is mercy when we ought to expect (because
we deserve) condemnation. It is hope when we seem trapped
in despair (Anfechtungen). Here in some of the last writings
of Luther, we find again the Theology of the Cross. Because
of humanity's fallen condition, one can neither understand
the redemptive word nor see God face to face; instead one
sees only the backside.32 Thus, God reveals himself where
it seems he should not be,33
But Jacob replies: "I understand, my son, that you
are defending the right of primogeniture according to the
Law, which you want to be preserved and honored. And it is
also my wish that it be firm and immovable. But now it is
not the time and place for the Law. No, this is the time and
place for the divine blessing, which is not subject to laws
or to our right or our wisdom." Accordingly, he does
not reject Joseph's opinion but leaves the matter undecided;
he does not abolish the Law but carries out the business of
the promise.34
This understanding of the important distinction between
Law and Gospel has important implications for Luther's understanding
of the relationship between the state and the believer. First,
it reinforces the danger of mixing the Two Kingdoms.35 For
example, if princes attempted to run states by the Gospel's
call to turn the other cheek, mass exploitation and sin would
result, and if pastor's governed the church by the sword,
the message of free grace would be hopelessly lost.36 Second,
this highlights the futility of attempting to coerce the conscience.
The state may demand outward conformity, but it can never
subjugate the will or the heart. God has given the secular
prince the power of the sword for the maintenance of order
and justice.37 Authorities ought to devote themselves to that
and leave the proclamation of the Word to the church and the
disposition of souls to God. The wisdom here is simple, yet
profound: pastors make poor kings, and kings make poor pastors.38
II. LUTHER AND THE CURA RELIGIONIS
The consistency apparent in Luther's discussion of authority,
the distinction of the secular and the sacred, and the separation
of the Law from the Gospel requires us to re-examine the proposed
turn to the cura religionis in the 1530s. To accomplish this,
however, we must examine one other aspect of Luther's thought
in the Genesis Lectures-natural law. Natural law is not a
subject much discussed in reference to the Two Kingdoms. It
is an unspoken assumption-there, yet not widely discussed.
Why then is it crucial here? Simply put, the argument that
Luther abandoned the Two Kingdoms in favor of the cura religionis
stands or falls on the proper consideration of Luther's conception
of natural law.
The argument in favor of the turn to the cura religionis
rests on Luther's exegesis of Psalms 8239 and 101.40 Both
Psalms lend themselves to the discussion of authority, government,
and justice. Luther uses Psalm 8241 as an opportunity to instruct
the authorities (a Furstenspiegel) of his time in the just
administration of society because of its focus on the establishment
of justice and the responsibility of the community to care
for the needy and weak. Psalm 10142 is even more amenable
to the instruction of authorities because it is a royal psalm
of David on the nature of kingship and may, in fact, be an
ancient Israelite oath taken by kings when they ascended to
office.
Two events precipitated Luther's writing of the exegesis
of Psalm 82 in 1530. First, the exegesis is a response to
the deplorable conditions witnessed in the 1529 Saxon church
visitations. second, it is also a response to a 1530 controversy
in Nuremberg concerning the right of secular government to
enforce religious conformity.4' These two events, however,
cannot be separated from the impending Diet of Augsburg. On
January 21, 1530, Charles V summoned an imperial Diet to meet
in Augsburg on April 8th. The fundamental task to be addressed
by the Diet was the Turkish threat. For Charles, the best
way to meet the threat was to secure internal unity. Religious
discord and internal political fraction are not the foundation
stones upon which one hopes to lay a successful campaign against
the "invading infidel." The designation of the Turkish
threat and the desire for unity as the central concerns of
the Diet placed the evangelical princes in a particularly
difficult situation by forcing them to defend their right
to reform (ius reformandi) religion in their realms. These
three events thus forced Luther to consider the prince's responsibility
to religion (that is, the cura religionis) and to defend the
ius reformandi.
Luther begins with some general comments about the fundamental
responsibilities of secular authority; he then moves on to
discuss the role and function of princes specifically. Concerning
authority, Luther argues first that it is established to provide
order and maintain the peace (82:1). Second, it must wield
the sword with justice and according to the statues and laws
of the nation (82:1). Building on these general principles,
Luther next examines the prince specifically. He begins by
arguing that princes ought to be godly and ought to "repress
the godless" (82:2). To accomplish this, the prince ought
to see to it that "God's Word is protected and supported"
(82:2). Given this assertion, it seems on first reading that
Luther plainly adopts the view that a prince should regulate
religion and ensure religious conformity within his realm.
However, the case is not as clear-cut as one might think.
While Luther certainly makes statements that imply a fairly
vigorous cum religionis,44 these statements cannot be understood
separate from their context.
In Rhetoric classes, one learns early on that to accept
the opposition's first premise is folly. In this case, the
discussion at hand seems to be the toleration of religious
minorities and the inappropriate use of the sword in religious
affairs. For example, Georg Frolich, the author of the 1530
Nuremberg tract Whether Secular Government has the Right to
Wield the Sword in Matters of Faith, writes,
But the New Testament speaks of two kingdoms on earth, mainly
the spiritual and the secular. The spiritual kingdom is the
kingdom of Christ in which Christ is the king. Similarly,
the secular realm also has its king, namely the emperor and
other authorities. . . . From this it is clear that Christ
does not wish the sword of the secular government to be used
to root anything out of his kingdom, but wishes rather to
do combat there solely by his word until the end of time.45
This quotation could easily have come from the pen of Luther,
and Frolich intends it that way. he argues that "fighting
for or against the true faith, the one as well as the other,
constitute interference in Christ's kingdom and rebellion
against it";46 thus religious minorities must be tolerated.
However, Luther consistently rejected a priori categories,
and does so here.
Though Frolich writes about tolerance for all religious
minorities, the issue in Nuremberg was really about the toleration
of Anabaptists.47 Refusing to fall into Frolich's rhetorical
trap, Luther does not discuss religious tolerance broadly
conceived, but rather Anabaptism and religious radicalism
in particular. Thus, Thomas Muntzer and Andreas Bodenstein
von Karlstadt lurk in the background of this text. An awareness
of this context then clarifies Luther's language. How should
a prince "support and defend God's word?" Luther
asks. He must punish sedition, rebuke blasphemy, and ensure
that those who preach have proper authority to preach.
That heresy and disbelief lie beyond the jurisdiction of
the prince is clearly true, and to attempt to force one to
believe is foolishness. However, not all heretics are created
equal. A simple heresy of works righteousness is not the same
thing as the heresy of Anabaptism. Because Anabaptists call
into question the legitimacy of government and attempt to
place themselves beyond the authority of the magistrate, they
are not "heretics only, but rebels, who are attacking
the rulers and their government, just as a thief attacks another's
goods, a murderer another's body, an adulterer another's wife;
and this is not to be tolerated."48 Beliefs are private
and untouchable, but actions and words have repercussions
that must be clearly and forcefully addressed. The care of
religion in this case is not so much the care of religion
as it is the assurance that governmental authority is not
overthrown; so that while from the outside it looks like the
prince has overstepped his bounds and meddled in religion,
he really has not.49
But, what of blasphemy? The civil government's authority
traditionally extends to the second table of the law. The
commandment against Blasphemy is on the first table. How can
Luther legitimately argue that punishing blasphemy is a civil
affair? The answer to this question lies in Luther's understanding
of natural law. Luther uses the phrases, "natural law,"
"laws of nature," and "command of God"
583 times in the American Edition of his works. Their occurrences
stretch from the very earliest writings to the very last.
Across these thousands of pages and decades of work, one thing
remains clear: blasphemy is not like the other prohibitions
on the first table. Rather, blasphemy belongs with those aspects
of the second table made known to all people.50 In 1525 in
the tract, "How Christians Ought to Regard Moses,"
Luther writes, "To be sure, the Gentiles have certain
laws in common with the Jews, such as these: there is one
God, no one is to do wrong to another, no one is to commit
adultery or murder or steal, and others like them. This is
written by nature into their hearts; they did not hear it
straight from heaven as the Jews did."51 Thus, for Luther,
blasphemy, together with theft, murder, and adultery, was
not simply a matter of conscience, but a matter of civil violation.
While we may view this position as incompatible with his
Two Kingdoms, he certainly did not. For Luther, as well as
all of his contemporaries (witness that Calvin's Geneva burned
Servetus to the universal acclamation of Christendom), blasphemy
was of a completely different order than, for example, keeping
the Sabbath. Not only was blasphemy a violation of natural
law, but in the worldview that Luther inhabited, it also ran
the risk of fierce divine punishment.52 When these two contexts
are fully appreciated, Luther's remarks in Psalm 82 are not
the deep bow to the cura religionis they seem to be at first.
Close reading of Psalm 101 finds many of the same issues
still in play. Nearly five years after the Psalm 82 commentary,
Luther is nevertheless concerned about the same fundamental
issues at stake in the late 1520s. Psalm 101 is dedicated
to John Frederick of Saxony and was published in 1534. Luther
wrote it following the death of John Frederick's father and
his ascension to the electoral office. At the time, John Frederick
was a mature adult and a dedicated Lutheran. Luther's thoughts,
then, are not issued in the midst of a particular crisis or
to an unseasoned leader, but are instead offered to a faithful
prince as he accepts a weighty responsibility. As such, Psalm
101 is more tempered and measured.
Luther begins by warning John Frederick to avoid the major
pitfall of authority-arrogance. Arrogance will lead to the
belief that one is competent in affairs that one has no business
meddling in:
[Many in authority] would have liked to see themselves alone
be masters on earth . . . and in this that have truly succeeded,
to such an extent that fifty percent or more of the secular
leaders have forgotten their own duties and have occupied
themselves with the church and with Masses, while the clergy
have in the same measure given up their priestly duties and
have busied themselves with hunting, waging war, and such
utterly secular affairs.53
This sad state of affairs has led to a deplorable mixing
of offices and thus a profound negligence of their rightful
duties. With this sad state before him, then, Luther moves
on to advise John Frederick in the wise administration of
his office.
He begins by reminding John Frederick that kings and princes
have been given a great responsibility and with it tremendous
power. This power must be administered with "mercy and
justice." Too much justice (that is, law and punishment)
will lead to tyranny. Too much mercy will fill the world with
"wicked rascals." John Frederick must seek "moderation
in all things." If he reigns in such a manner, he would
truly be a blessing to his people. This course is not easy,
however, and so Luther urges John Frederick to pray constantly
for God's grace.54
Luther then moves on to offer more specific advice. First,
a ruler must rule discreetly, uprightly, and be attentive
to God's Word. In other words, the ruler must not place himself
beyond the admonition of God's Word. Too often, Luther felt,
rulers ignored God's Word and ruled according to their own
wisdom. This neglects a great resource. Second, the ruler
must punish blasphemy and those who despise God. Here he echoes
his sentiments in Psalm 82, but here we also gain some insight
as to why this is even necessary. For if knowledge of God
is natural, why then do some fall into blasphemy instead of
mere idolatry? The answer is that natural law and reason are
not equally apprehended by all, for the world is full of "fools
and children." Thus God has created things in "such
a way that men are not alike and that one should rule while
the other should obey him."55 Instruction, thus, as well
as just punishment, is an end in the chastisement of blasphemers.
Finally, the just ruler must punish lawbreakers and shun the
company of the immoral. Nearly all the rest of Psalm is devoted
to warning John Frederick against the "confusion and
mingling of the secular and spiritual realms."56
III. CONCLUSION
As Luther concluded his work on Genesis in the early fall
of 1545, he had one final occasion to return to the issue
of government and religion.57 The context is chapter 49. This
is a pivotal chapter in the Pentateuch, for it is the deathbed
blessing of the Tribes of Israel by Jacob. The text lends
itself to a discussion of the Two Kingdoms, because of the
blessing bestowed upon the House of Judah. Here, Judah is
portrayed as the ruling house in the family of Jacob. Jacob
prophesies that the scepter (or rule) of Judah shall not pass
away until Shiloh shall come.
The text was understood in the early modern era in two ways.
The beginning of the text was understood as a prophecy of
David's rule and kingdom. The end of the sentence was understood
as a messianic prophecy (with Shiloh representing the Messiah)
foretelling the Kingdom of Christ.58 This distinction between
the kingdom of David and the Kingdom of Christ gave Luther
a final opportunity to clarify the proper relationship between
the weltliche Reich and the geistliche Reich. He begins by
explaining that the Kingdom of David and the Kingdom of Christ
cannot be the same because the historical record is clear:
"The kingdom [of David] has fallen, the Jews have been
dispersed and scattered over the whole world." This kingdom
of David "which was governed by arms, the sword, and
violence has now ceased." In its place, the Kingdom of
Christ has been established. The Kingdom of Christ is not
a kingdom of arms or the sword but "consists in hearing
and obeying or believing the Word by which it is administered."
Luther writes, In the Word, therefore, there is a most powerful
kingdom against death, sin, the devil, and all their tyranny,
with power to save, to set free, and to defend for eternal
salvation. About these things the rabbis know nothing. Nor
do the papists or the Turks. But it is our duty to inculcate
these matters diligently and to heed this striking difference
between the kingdom of Christ and that of others, even David's.
For this is what Jacob means: "The kingdom of my son
David, which cannot be administered without the sword and
arms, will not endure; but the kingdom of . . . (Shiloh) will
follow, and it will be governed by the Word alone." Thus
Christ says: "Go into all the world and preach the Gospel
to the whole creation" (Mark 16:15). For that Word is
most powerful. It is able to save from the hands of death
and the devil as well as from the power of hell, and to translate
into the kingdom of God. To this king, then, the nations shall
listen; that is, they will be ruled by the Word. The work
will be done through preaching. This will be the mark distinguishing
the kingdom of Christ from the empires of the world, which
are ruled by the sword and physical might. . . . For the Gospel
is something heard (Euangelium enim est auditio). . . . It
is not with the sword, not with fire, not with violence but
with listening or hearing and with the doctrine of faith that
. . . (Shiloh) will rule. And not only the Jews but all the
peoples of the whole world will obey Him.59
Luther's distinction between a kingdom of force and a kingdom
of the Word was more germane to the political situation around
him than at any other time since he began his Lectures on
Genesis. As he wrote, the signs of impending doom for the
Reformation were rising significantly on the horizon. Already
by mid 1545, the emperor had (due largely to Philipp of Hesse's
bigamy) pacified the Schmalkaldic League, suppressed the Reformation
in the duchy of Julich-Cleves, obtained the support of King
Francis of France for a campaign against the Protestants,
and secured his border with the Turks. For the first time
in his reign, Charles was now in a strong enough position
to fulfill the pledge to destroy Luther's reforms that he
had made in Worms in 1520.60
As this crisis edged toward the boiling point, Luther set
out once again the fact that the conscience cannot be compelled.
Force and might rightly belong to the weltliche Reich, but
when force is used to compel belief, it corrupts the gospel
into law. Luther's point seems plain enough; the emperor may
march into battle to destroy the Reformation, but he will
ultimately fail because he has chosen the wrong weapon for
this war. "The kingdom of Shiloh is a kingdom of the
Word; for He calls and rules the peoples by the Word alone,
without arms and force. But those who refuse to hear the Word
do not belong to the kingdom of Christ. Therefore a people
should allow itself to be drawn by the Word, not slavishly
forced by scourges, prison, and floggings as men in worldly
empires are compelled to obedience by force."61
While it is certainly true that the cura religionis and
the landesherrliche Kirchenregiment came to dominate religious
and political life in the Holy Roman Empire following the
Peace of Augsburg in 1555, I see no strong evidence to support
the view that this would have been welcomed or much appreciated
by Luther.62 For Luther, the involvement of princes in religious
affairs was always a matter of emergency. He never intended
it to be a permanent state of affairs, and, as we have noted
here, he repeatedly resisted efforts to coerce religious uniformity
and belief by force.63
Whitford assesses the validity of such a shift by examining
Luther's Lectures on Genesis that have been as heavily criticized
and critiqued as his understanding of the Two Kingdoms, secular
authority, and religious freedom. Thomas Muntzer was but the
first in a long line of polemicists, journalists, politicians,
and scholars who have accused Luther of releasing the sword
of secular authority from all control and thereby opening
up centuries of authoritarian subjugation. On the other hand,
Peter Frarin argued in 1566 that Protestantism equaled sedition,
rebellion, and the subversion of civil order.
Copyright American Society of Church History Mar 2004 |
1. This essay was originally presented at the Tenth International
Congress for Luther Research in Copenhagen, Denmark in August
2002.
2. Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther's Theology: Its Historical
and Systematic Development, trans. and ed. Roy A. Harrisvillc
(Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1999), 3-6.
3. The list of detractors is far too large to list here. For
Muntzer, see "A Highly provoked Vindication and Refutation
of the unspiritual, soft-living, Flesh in Wittenberg, whose
robbery and distortion of Scripture has so grievously polluted
our wretched Christian Church," in The Collected Works
of Thomas Muntzer, trans. and ed. Peter Matheson (Edinburgh:
T and T Clark, 1998), 324-50. For a recent example of this
argument, see Richard Marius, Martin Luther: The Christian
between God and Death (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University, 1999).
4. Peter Frarin, An Oration against the Unlawful Insurrection
of the Protestants of our Time (Antwerp, 1566). This tract
is available through Early English Books Online ( www.eebo.org).
5. For a recent example of this, see Allster E. McGrath, Reformation
Thought: An Introduction, 2nd. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993),
209 f.: "Luther reinforced [the princes'] political authority
by grounding it in divine providence. God governs the world,
including the church, through the princes and magistrates.
The church is in this world, and so must submit itself to
the world order. . . . The way was [thus] opened to the eventual
domination of the church by the state, which was a virtual
universal trait of Lutheranism. The failure of the German
church to oppose Hitler in the 1930s is widely seen as reflecting
the inadequacies of Luther's political thought."
6. See, James Estes, "The Role of Godly Magistrates in
the Church: Melanchthon As Luther's Interpreter and Collaborator,"
Church History 67:3 (1998): 463-84.
7. Estes rightly notes that a comprehensive examination of
Melanchthon's thought regarding the civil magistrate has yet
to be written. For general introductions, see Franz Lau, "Melanchthon
und die Ordnung der Kirche," in Phillip Melanchthon:
Forschungsbeitrage zur verhindertsten Widerkehr seines Todestages,
ed. Walter Ellinger (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht,
1961); Timothy Wengert, Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness:
Philip Melanchthon's Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); and again Timothy
Wengert, LHZU and Gospel: Philip Melanchthon's Debate with
John Agricola of Eisleben over Poenitentta (Grand Rapids,
Mich.: Baker, 1997).
8. See Estes, "Godly Magistrate," 473 f.
9. In the course of reassessing Luther's commitment to the
Two Kingdoms, this essay also contributes to the continuing
conversation regarding the veracity of the Lectures on Genesis.
In 1936, Peter Meinhold (Die Genesisvorlesung und ihre Herausgeber
[Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1936]) argued that Luther's Lectures
on Genesis could not be trusted to present an accurate representation
of the "late" Luther. He argued that followers and
supporters of Philip Melanchthon edited the Lectures in an
attempt to bolster their arguments against Gnesio (or "True")
Lutherans in the theologically volatile years following Luther's
death. By examining the degree to which Luther either continued
to use the Two Kingdoms doctrine as a framework for discussing
religion and the state in the Genesis Lectures or abandoned
it in favor of the cura religionis, we cannot only assess
the degree to which the late Luther is consistent with the
young Luther but also test Meinhold's thesis. The degree to
which government could regulate religion was fundamental to
the disagreements between Melanchthon and the Gnesio-Lutherans,
especially during the conflicts over the Augsburg (1548) Interim
and the so-called Leipzig Interim. If, as this essay argues,
there is a consistent use of the Two Kingdoms throughout the
Genesis Lectures, then Meinhold's thesis is undermined because
if editors had manipulated the text to serve their theological
debates, a natural (indeed crucial) area for revision would
have been the discussion of religion and the state. One must
also ask why, if the editors did manipulate the text, did
staunch Gnesios find the Genesis Lectures worthy of translation.
Robert Kolb (Martin Luther as Prophet, Teacher, and Hero:
Images of the Reformer 1520-1620 [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker,
1999], 145 f.) notes that Basilius Faber, one of the authors
of the Magdeburg Centuries, translated into German and introduced
the Genesis Lectures. For a further discussion of the reliability
of the Genesis Lectures, see Bernhard Klaus, "Die Lutheruberlieferung
Veit Dietrichs und ihre Problematik," in Zeitschrift
fur bayerische Kirchengeschichte 53 (1984): 33-47. See also,
Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: The Preservation of the Church,
1532-1546, trans. James L. Schaaf (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress,
1993), 136-41. Here quoting from page 136, "These great
lectures are unquestionably monumental documents of Luther's
mature theology, and they also reflect his participation in
the developments, problems, and conflicts of the last decade
of his life." Brecht then goes on to explain the concerns
regarding the Genesis Lectures and concludes, "Nevertheless,
the bulk of this commentary, with its amazing richness of
features and allusions, undoubtedly does come from Luther,
and his spirit is evident in it. Despite the subsequent alterations,
this monumental work may still be regarded as primarily his
work and thus as a useful source." See also, Ulrich Asendorf,
Lectura in Biblia: Luthers Genesisvorlesung (1535-1545) (Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1998). See 33 f., for a discussion
of Meinhold's thesis. See 248 f., for a discussion of the
Two Kingdoms in the Lectures on Genesis.
10. In this regard this essay also contributes to the debate
about how much Luther really changed his positions regarding
the status and role of the civil magistrate in ordering the
religious life of the community. In Tyranny and Resistance:
The Magdeburg Confession and the Lutheran Tradition, (St.
Louis, Mo.: Concordia, 2001), I argued for an overall consistency
in Luther's thought, while others such as Cargill Thompson
(Luther's Political Thought) have argued for a dramatic change.
By comparing some of Luther's statements on secular authority
written in the 1520s to ones written in the 1540s, this essay
furthers the discussion of whether or not Luther did indeed
remain consistent or whether he changed his position dramatically
over time. Thus we hope to test Helmar Junghans' thesis that
what appears to be a change in position may not in fact be
one. He writes, "Luther often took up questions of the
day and dealt with them. The manner in which the questions
were formulated changed in the course of his life. Accordingly,
he wrote repeatedly about the same subject, but not always
with the same goal nor always with the same tone. Emphases
were shifted. Taken out of context, some of his remarks appear
to be contradictory and to signal great changes." See,
Helmar Junghans, "The Center of the Theology of Martin
Luther," in And Every Tongue Confess: Essays in Honor
of Norman Nagel on the Occasion of His Sixty-fifth Birthday,
eds. Gerald S. Krispin and Jon D. Vieker, (Chelsea, Mich.:
Bookcrafters, 1990), 180.
11. I have chosen to continue using the phrase Two Kingdoms
for two reasons. First, it is far better known and has far
more literature devoted to it than do the more technically
precise terms (Realm and Government); thus our discussion
here can be more easily placed within that body of work. But,
also, just as importantly, I believe the idea of the Two Kingdoms
nicely apprehends the polyvalent nature of Luther's thought
on the Two Realms and the Two Governments. If we allow ourselves
to be too distracted by the technicalities of Reich verses
Regiment, we will fail to see the forest for the trees. The
two ideas form a cooperative whole that can best be maintained
by continuing to speak of Two Kingdoms. The literature on
the Two Kingdoms is vast; some of the most important works
on the subject include Paul Althaus, The Ethics of Martin
Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia, Penn.: Fortress,
1972), and his "Luthers Lehre von den beiden Reichen
im Feuer der Kritik," Lutherjahrbuch 24 (1957): 40-67;
Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms in
the Context of His Theology (Philadelphia, Penn.: Fortress,
1966); Thomas Brady, "Luther and Society: Two Kingdoms
or Three Estates? Tradition and Experience in Luther's Social
Teaching," Lutherjahrbuch 52 (1985): 197-224; W. J. D.
Cargill Thompson, The Political Thought of Martin Luther,
and his "The 'Two Kingdoms' and the 'Two Regiments':
Some Problems of Luther's Zwei-Reiche-Lehre," Journal
of Theological Studies 20 (1969): 164-85; Ulrich Duchrow and
Wolfgang Huber, eds., Die Ambivalenz der Zweireicheslehre
in lutherischen Kirchen des 20. Jahrhunderts, (Gutersloh:
Gutersloher Verlagshaus, 1976); Gerhard Ebeling, "The
Necessity of the Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms," in Word
and Faith, trans. James W. Leitch (Philadelphia, Penn.: Fortress,
1963), 386-406. More recent examinations include Robert J.
Bast, "From Two Kingdoms to Two Tablets: The Ten Commandments
and the Christian Magistrate," Archiv fur Reformationsgeschichte
89 (1998): 79-95; William H. Lazareth, Christians and Society:
Luther, the Bible, and Social Ethics, (Minneapolis, Minn.:
Fortress, 2001); Karl-Heinz zur Muhlen, "Two Kingdoms,"
in Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation, ed. Hans J. Hillerbrand,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4:184-88, and David
M. Whitford, "Martin Luther's Political Encounters,"
in The Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther, ed. Donald McKim,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 178-92.
12. On Temporal Authority (1523): "[God] has subjected
[the wicked] to the sword so that, even though they would
like to, they are unable to practice their wickedness, and
if they do practice it they cannot do so without fear or with
success and impunity." Luther's Works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan
and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia, 1955-86),
45:91, (hereafter LW); and D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische
Gesamtausgabe, 60 vols. (Wiemar: Bohlau, 1883-1980), 11:251
(hereafter, WA).
13. On Temporal Authority (1523): "For this reason one
must carefully distinguish between these two governments.
Both must be permitted to remain; the one to produce righteousness,
the other to bring about external peace and prevent evil deeds.
Neither one is sufficient in the world without the other.
No one can become righteous in the sight of God by means of
the temporal government, without Christ's spiritual government.
Christ's government does not extend over all men; rather,
Christians are always a minority in the midst of non-Christians.
Now where temporal government or law alone prevails, there
sheer hypocrisy is inevitable, even though the commandments
be God's very own. For without the Holy Spirit in the heart
no one becomes truly righteous, no matter how fine the works
he does. On the other hand, where the spiritual government
alone prevails over land and people, there wickedness is given
free rein and the door is open for all manner of rascality,
for the world as a whole cannot receive or comprehend it"
(LW 45:92, WA 11:252).
14. Whether Soldiers, too, Can Be Saved, LW 46:95. Translation
altered; compare to "das sint der Apostel zeit das weltliche
schwerd und oberkeit nie so klerlich beschrieben und herrlich
geprciset ist . . . als durch mich" (WA 19:625).
15. "Advent Church Postils," (1521), WA 7:502, 34
f.: "Quando autem pene universe scriptura totiusque Theologiae
cognitio pendet in recta cognitione legis et Euangelii (Nearly
the entire Scripture and the knowledge of all theology depends
upon the correct understanding of law and gospel.)" Though
nearly identical, this is not the Advent Postil on Matthew
11:2-10 translated in The Sermons of Martin Luther (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 1996) 1:87-113. That sermon, which
is for the same day and scripture, is later and considerably
expanded.
16. Treatise on Good Works (1520): "Now this only indicates
a few tasks for the government. But there are so many additional
good works that every moment of their lives they have an abundant
number of tasks and opportunities to serve God. But these
works, like the others, should also be done in faith, in fact,
as an exercise of faith, so that nobody thinks he is pleasing
to God on account of what he does, but rather by a confident
trust in his favor he does such tasks for a gracious and loving
God and to his honor and praise alone. And in so doing, he
serves and benefits his neighbor" (LW 44:97, WA 6:262
f.).
17. The best explication of the freedom of the Gospel is found
in Luther's Lectures on Galatians (2:21); the best example
of his commitment to the principle of the freedom found in
the gospel is in his response to the Wittenberg Disturbances.
There in the Invocavit Sermons (LW 51:67-100, WA 10/3:1-64)
we see that for Luther when the Gospel (or Karlstadt's proposed
church reform) is transformed from gift to requirement, the
essence of the Gospel is sacrificed and abandoned. Luther's
disagreement with Karlstadt had little to do with the types
of reform, or even really the speed of implementation. Where
Luther found fault was in how the reforms were implemented
and why. Luther himself had argued for Communion to the laity
in both kinds; he was really indifferent about images and
was open to clerical marriage. Karlstadt's reforms were not
the problem. For Luther, all of these reforms were opportunities
for the congregation-not commands. Because of Karlstadt's
understanding of Christian Identity (see, Whether One Should
Proceed Slowly), these reforms were not optional but necessary.
Regardless of how well intentioned the reform, for Luther,
if it was forced upon the conscience it was not a reform at
all but a new law.
18. LW 1:109, WA 62:82.
19. That is to say, the Third Use of the Law. Luther never
used the phrase triplex usus legis in this manner, but its
essence is here depicted. For the paradigmatic expression
of the Third Use, see John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian
Religion 2.7. In a sense Luther also expresses here the idea
Karl Earth attempted to capture in his famous "Gospel
and Law"; see Community, State, and Church: Three Essays.
Intro.Will Herberg (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1960), and
Church Dogmatics II/2 (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1957), chapter
8.
20. Genesis 9:6, LW 2:139, WA 42:361.
21. Genesis 2:16-17, LW 1:104, WA 62:79.
22. Genesis 9:6, "This text is outstanding and worthy
of note; for here God establishes government and gives it
the sword, to hold wantonness in check, lest violence and
other sins proceed without limit. If God had not conferred
this divine power on men, what sort of life do you suppose
we would be living? Because he foresaw that there would always
be a great abundance of evil men, He established this outward
remedy, which the world had not had thus far, in order that
wantonness might not increase beyond measure. With this hedge,
these walls, God has given protection for our life and possessions"
(LW 2:141, WA 42:361). This sentiment is exactly in keeping
with his position in On Temporal Authority in 1523: "Hence,
a man who would venture to govern an entire country or the
world with the gospel would be like a shepherd who should
put together in one fold wolves, lions, eagles, and sheep,
and let them mingle freely with one another, saying, 'Help
yourselves, and be good and peaceful toward one another. The
fold is open, there is plenty of food. You need have no fear
of dogs and clubs.' The sheep would doubtless keep the peace
and allow themselves to be fed and governed peacefully, but
they would not live long, nor would one beast survive another"
(LW 45:91 f., WA 11:251 f.).
23. Genesis 10:8-11: "Cush became the father of Nimrod;
he was the first on earth to become a mighty warrior. He was
a mighty hunter before the LORD; therefore it is said, 'Like
Nimrod a mighty hunter before the LORD.' The beginning of
his kingdom was Babel, Erech, and Accad, all of them in the
land of Shinar. From that land he went into Assyria, and built
Nineveh, Rehoboth-ir, Calah, and Resen between Nineveh and
Calah; that is the great city," NRSV.
24. Genesis 10:8-9, LW 2:196, WA 42:400.
25. Luther makes n great deal out of the derivation of Nimrod
(dwrmn) from dr'm (marad). Marad means to "fall away"
or to "rebel." See, LW 2:197, WA 42:400.
26. Genesis 10:8-9, LW 2:198, WA 42:401. Translation altered;
compare to, "non contentus tyrannide in Republica, etiam
in Ecclesia vult dominari, Erigit novos cultus, eos qui coram
Deo sunt, opprimit. Nam Moses diserte distinguit duos conspectus,
alterum coram Deo, alterum coram hominibus. Quod igitur coram
Deo bonum et iustum est, id mundus semper iudicat malum et
iniustum."
27. The connection between tyranny and the usurpation of another's
jurisdiction was by the 1540s commonplace and is an allusion
to the Saxon theory of resistance developed by Gregor Bruck
and presented to Luther and others at Torgau in 1530. See
David M. Whitford, Tyranny and Resistance, and "From
Speyer to Magdeburg: The Development and Maturation of a Hybrid
Theory of Resistance," in Archiv fur Reformationsgeschichte,
forthcoming.
28. Genesis 10:8-9, LW 2:197, WA 42:401.
29. Genesis 48:17-19: "When Joseph saw that his father
laid his right hand on the head of Ephraim, it displeased
him; so he took his father's hand, to remove it from Ephraim's
head to Manasseh's head. Joseph said to his father, 'Not so,
my father! Since this one is the firstborn, put your right
hand on his head.' But his father refused, and said, 'I know,
my son, I know; he also shall become a people, and he also
shall be great. Nevertheless his younger brother shall be
greater than he, and his offspring shall become a multitude
of nations,'" NRSV.
30. Genesis 48:16-17, LW 8:170, WA 44:703.
31. Genesis 48:16-17: "The kingdom of grace is one thing,
and the kingdom of the Law is another thing. The Law checks
sin, shows the rod, and announces the wrath of God and punishment
to those who sin. This is the proper office of the Law. It
serves to restrain evil, stubborn, and smug sinners. But the
kingdom of grace is a kingdom of mercy, of pardon, of redemption,
and of liberation from sins and the punishments for sins"
(LW 8:170, WA 44:703).
32. See Exodus 33 where Moses seeks to see the Lord face to
face, but instead sees only his backside. See also Luther's
Heidelberg Disputation (1518): "He deserves to be called
a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest
things of God seen through suffering and the cross" (LW
31:40, WA 1:354).
33. See Theses 3 and 4 of the Heidelberg Disputation. Jos.
E. Vercruyse, in "Gesetz und liebe, Die Struktur der
'Heidelberg Disputation' Luthers (1518)," Lutherjahrbuch
18 (1981):
34. Genesis 48:16-17. LW 8:175, WA 44:706.
35. An early example of the tragedy that results from mixing
the Two Kingdoms is the Flood. When discussing the reasons
for the Flood, Luther attributes primary causality to the
mixing of the Kingdoms. Luther writes, "Moses is explaining
the kind of power on which [giants of old] relied, namely,
secular or worldly power. They despised the ministry of the
Word as a worthless occupation. Therefore they seized upon
a worldly occupation, just as our papists have done. . . .
[These giants of old must be compared with the small church]
who have neither prestige nor wealth but do have the Word.
This is their only wealth, but it is wealth that the world
both despises and persecutes. By contrast the nepiliym, or
giants, not only usurp the glorious name of the church on
the grounds that they are descended from the patriarchs, but
they also wield authority. They are the lords, and with their
power they oppress the wretched church. . . . Thus this passage
presents a description of the sins besetting that age, namely,
that they were men alienated from the Word and given over
to their lusts and reprobate minds, men who sinned against
the Holy Spirit with persistent impenitence, the defense of
ungodly acts, and assaults on the acknowledged truth. Nevertheless,
in the midst of all their blasphemous conduct they retained
a reputation and distinction not only as secular government
but also as church, as though they had been elevated by God
to the position of angels. But when things had come to such
a pass, when Noah and Lamech, together with their forefather
Methuselah, were teaching in vain, God gave these people over
to the desires of their own hearts (Ps. 81:12) and kept silence
until they would face the Flood in which they were refusing
to believe" (LW 2:36-38, WA 42:285-87).
36. Genesis 49:3: "This had to be done in this way, especially
among the people of the Old Testament. Although there is mercy
in this nation and forgiveness of sins, yet there is no pure
mercy or the pure kingdom of the Gospel and grace; but there
is also a part of the political kingdom, where there must
also be examples of punishments. Here the executioner must
wield the sword and make use of the gallows and the wheel
to frighten and warn the others, even when the sin is forgiven.
Thus although a thief is pardoned, nevertheless he is brought
to the gallows. The sin of those who must suffer capital punishment
is forgiven by God, but the executioner does not forgive it
by not demanding the punishment ordained by the laws. The
executioner does not forgive them; he gives them their just
deserts. Thus Paul says: 'He does not bear the sword in vain;
he is the servant of God to execute His wrath, that is, to
inflict punishment, on the wrongdoer' (Rom. 13:4). Yet the
thief and the murderer, etc., are not condemned if they repent
and believe in Christ. Nor do they feel the shame of the gallows
after death. But their descendants should look at this and
reflect: 'If you steal, you, too, will suffer like punishment/
This doctrine is necessary and must by all means be retained
in the world. They say that as often as Emperor Maximilian
passed a place of public execution, he uncovered his head
and saluted it with these words: 'Hail, holy justice!' For
if there were no punishments and executions, we would achieve
nothing with our sermons and the forgiveness of sins, and
the populace would abuse the doctrine of the mercy of God
for boundless license to sin" (LW 8:205, WA 44:728 f.).
For an early example of this line of thinking, see On Temporal
Authority (1523): "If anyone attempted to rule the world
by the gospel and to abolish all temporal law and sword on
the plea that all are baptized and Christian, and that, according
to the gospel, there shall be among them no law or sword-or
need for either-pray tell me, friend, what would he be doing?
he would be loosing the ropes and chains of the savage wild
beasts and letting them bite and mangle everyone, meanwhile
insisting that they were harmless, tame, and gentle creatures;
but I would have the proof in my wounds" (LW 45:91, WA
11:251).
37. See Genesis 9:6: "In this connection the following
difference must be maintained between the authority of God
and that of human beings: even if the world should be unable
to bring a charge against us and we should be guiltless before
the world, God still has the power to kill us. For sin, with
which we were born, makes us all guilty before God. But hviman
beings have the power to kill only when we are guilty before
the world and when the crime has been established. For this
reason courts have been established and a definite method
of procedure has been prescribed. Thus a crime may be investigated
and proved before the death sentence is imposed. Therefore
we must take careful note of this passage, in which God establishes
government, to render judgment not only about matters involving
life but also about matters less important than life. Thus
a government should punish the disobedience of children, theft,
adultery, and perjury. In short, it should punish all sins
forbidden in the second Table" (LW 2:140, WA 42:360).
38. Genesis 48:20: "Therefore our theology and the New
Testament should give special emphasis to this part of the
heavenly doctrine, although the Law must be taught too. But
the kingdom of God does not consist in the Law; it consists
in the Word of the promise. Today it is commonly said: 'He
loves the Word. he loves the Word of the Gospel, or the ministry/
But in the papal decretals and canons you will not find even
a syllable about the Word. They thunder only about the confession
of sins, contrition, satisfaction, obedience to the pope,
and the observance of monastic rules. But there is the deepest
silence concerning the promises. Accordingly, the papal kingdom
was a horrible devastation of the church, and even now promise
is an unheard-of word to the pope and the cardinals. But although
our kingdom of the New Testament should stress the doctrine
of the Law to preserve discipline and civil obedience and
the honor due to magistrates and parents, the kingdom of God
does not consist in these things; it consists in the Word,
that is, in the promise, which is the true and proper ministry
of the New Testament" (LW 8:181, WA 44:711).
39. WA 31/1:189-218, LW 13:41-72.
40. WA 51:200-264, LW 13:145-224.
41. "A Psalm of Asaph. God has taken his place in the
divine council; in the midst of the gods he holds judgment:
'How long will you judge unjustly and show partiality to the
wicked? Give justice to the weak and the fatherless; maintain
the right of the afflicted and the destitute. Rescue the weak
and the needy; deliver them from the hand of the wicked/ They
have neither knowledge nor understanding, they walk about
in darkness; all the foundations of the earth are shaken.
I say, 'You are gods, sons of the Most High, all of you; nevertheless,
you shall die like men, and fall like any prince/ Arise, O
God, judge the earth; for to thee belong all the nations!"
NRSV.
42. "I will sing of loyalty and of justice; to you, O
Lord, I will sing. I will study the way that is blameless.
When shall I attain it? I will walk with integrity of heart
within my house; I will not set before my eyes anything that
is base. I hate the work of those who fall away; it shall
not cling to me. Perverseness of heart shall be far from me;
T will know nothing of evil. One who secretly slanders a neighbor
I will destroy. A haughty look and an arrogant heart I will
not tolerate. I will look with favor on the faithful in the
land, so that they may live with me; whoever walks in the
way that is blameless shall minister to me. No one who practices
deceit shall remain in my house; no one who utters lies shall
continue in my presence. Morning by morning 1 will destroy
all the wicked in the land, cutting off all evildoers from
the city of the Lord," NRSV.
43. See James Estes, "The Role of Godly Magistrates in
the Church," 474. For the Nuremberg documents, see James
M. Estes, Whether secular Government has the right to Wield
the Sword in Matters of Faith: A Controversy in Nurnberg,
1530, (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies,
1994). See also Lazarus Spengler's letter to Veit Dietrich
(WA 31/1:183-84). The best timeline seems to imply that Luther
began to work on the exegesis in late 1529 following the visitations.
By March 17, 530 we know (via Spengler's letter) that a draft
version was underway. The events in Nuremberg (which began
in the early spring of 1530 and were reported to Wittenberg
by March 17) may have caused Luther to revisit the exegesis.
The text was completed before Luther left for Coburg on April
3, 1530. By June 2 the first edition had sold out.
44. For example, in exegeting verse two he writes, "For
if God's Word is protected and supported so that it can be
freely taught and learned, and if the sects and false teachers
are given no opportunity and are not defended against the
teachers who fear God, what ercater treasure can there be
in a land?" (LW 13:52. WA 31/1:199).
45. Whether Secular Government has the Right to Wield the
Sword in Matters of Faith, in Estes, Controversy in Nurnberg,
42 f. In the Controversy in Nurnberg volume, the author of
the text in question is referred to as "Anonymous Nurnberger."
Only recently has Estes (in a magnificent example of historical
detective work) identified Freilich as the author. See James
Estes, "Introduction," Godly Magistrates and Church
Order: Johannes Brenz and the Establishment of the Lutheran
Territorial Church in Germany, 1524-1559 (Toronto: Centre
for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2001), 17, n. 27.
Full details for the attribution of authorship will be published
in Lazarus Spengler, Schriften 3 (Gutersloh: Gutersloher Verlagshaus,
forthcoming).
46. Frolich, Secular Government, 45.
47. Estes, Nurnberg Controversy, 12, n. 11.
48. "Psalm 82:4," LW 13:61, WA 31/1:208.
49. See Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther's Theology, 319: "What
induced him to [appeal to the temporal arm for aid] was no
longer the idea that a territory had to be confessionally
self-contained, but that Thomas Muntzer had called for a general
uprising, and for this reason the debate with him had to be
carried on not merely theologically, but also politically
and militarily. To exercise tolerance toward Muntzer would
have spelled outright surrender on the part of the Saxon church
and the elector. With his two-kingdoms doctrine Luther with
full and objective right opposed Muntzer and his revolutionary
spiritual Christianity with 'rationality,' with the legitimacy
of the temporal power and its function in establishing order."
Lohse sees a difference, however, between Muntzer and the
Anabaptists. Lohse argues that Luther's response to Anabaptism
calls into question his own presuppositions. I am not convinced,
however, that Luther saw any difference between Thomas Muntzer
and Michael Sattler. Both were equally dangerous. Luther,
I think, would have argued that this suspicion was confirmed
in Munster.
50. In The Ethics of Martin Luther, Paul Althaus (29) claims
that natural law included both tables of the law. I remain
unconvinced. While in Against the Heavenly Prophets (LW 40:98,
WA 18:81), Luther does state that the Natural Law is confirmed
and restated in the Decalogue of Moses, I do not believe that
this is the same thing as stating the content of the one is
identical to the content of the other.
51. LW 35:164, WA 16:372. This sentiment is expressed throughout
Luther's career; other examples include in the 1537's Die
erste Disputation gegen der Antinomer (First Disputation Against
the Antinomians), "Decalogus vero haeret adhuc in conscientia.
Nam si Deus nunquam tulisset legem per Mosen, tamen mens humana
naturaliter habet hanc notitiam, Deum esse colendum, proximum
diligendum." (The Decalogue is lodged in the conscience.
If God had never given the Law of Moses, the mind of man still
has the knowledge that God is to be worshiped and our neighbor
is to be loved.) WA 39/1:374, and from ca. 1543, Lectures
on Genesis 32:12, "Thus all men naturally understand
and come to the conclusion that God is some kind of beneficent
divine power, from whom all good things are to be sought and
hoped for. God is One who promises, and He is truthful, that
is, He makes promises to all men in the law of nature, which
says: 'Call upon God, or worship Him"' (LW 6:113, WA
44:84). This text is particularly interesting because Luther
differentiates between the simple idolatry and blasphemy.
Idolatry is misplaced worship; blasphemy is outright disregard
or contempt for God's person. For Luther, blasphemy was far
more serious.
52. For an interesting contemporary account of the dangers
befalling those who anger God, see Basilius Manner's Eedencken
vonn dem Kriege/ der Anno /ec. sechs/siben/ vnd viertzig im
land zu Meissen vnd Sachsen gefulejhrt ist/wo fur erzuhalten
sey/gestatt (Basel, 1557), which highlights the disasters
that befell those who sided against the Protestants in the
Schmalkaldic War; see especially F1^sup r^-F4^sup v^. For
a discussion of this pamphlet, see Robert Kolb, "The
Legal Case for Martyrdom: Basilius Monner on Johann Friedrich
the Elder and the Smalkald War," in Reformation und Recht:
Festgabe fur Gottfried Seebaß zum 65. Geburtstag, ed.
Irene Dingel, Volker Leppin, and Christoph Storhm (Gutersloh:
Chr. Kaiser, 2002), 144-60. I wish to thank Prof. Kolb for
providing me with a copy of the essay before it was published.
53. Psalm 101, "Preface," LW 13:146, WA 51:201.
54. Psalm 101:1, LW 13:152f., WA 51:206.
55. Psalm 101:1, LW 13:159, WA 51:212.
56. Psalm 101:5, LW 13:196, WA 51:240.
57. Luther began his Genesis Lectures in June of 1535; by
January 1545 we know from a letter he sent to Wenceslaus Link
that he had begun chapter 45. He completed the entire project
on November 17, 1545. Given this time frame, he was probably
on chapter 49 sometime in September or early October 1545.
58. For a contemporary example of this exegetical tradition,
see John Calvin's Commentary on Genesis: "For (as I have
just hinted) the origin of the kingdom in David is not here
promised, but its absolute perfection in the Messiah."
59. Genesis 49:10, LW 8:239, WA 44:758. Translation altered;
compare to: "Est igitur regnum polentissimum in verbo
contra mortem, peccatum, et Diabolum, et universam tyrannidem
eorum cum potentia ad salvandum, liberandum et defendendum
in salutem aeternam. . . . De his Rabini nihil sciunt, nec
Papistae, nec Turcae. At nostrum est ista inculcare sedulo,
et hanc insignem differentiam regni Christi et aliorum, etiam
Davidis, observare. Hoc enim vult Iacob: Regnum filii mei
Davidis, quod sine gladio et armis non potest administrari,
non durabit, sed sequetur regnum Schilo, quod solo verbo gubernabitur.
Sicut inquit Christus: 'Ite in orbem universum, et praedicate
Euangelium omni creaturae,' Id enim verbum potentissimum est,
quod potest salvare de manibus mortis et Diaboli, ac potentia
inferorum, et transferre in regnum Dei. Huic igitur regi erit
audientia populorum, hoc est, verbo regentur. Es wirt mit
predigen zugehen, erit nota discernens regnum Christi a mundi
imperiis, quae reguntur gladio et vi corporali. . . . Euangelium
enim est auditio. . . . Non gladio, non flamma, non vi, sed
audientia sive auditu et doctrina fidei regnabit Schilo, et
obedient ei non solum Iudaei, sed omnes populi totius orbis
terrarum."
60. Deutsche Reichstagsakten: Jungere Reihe, Hrsg. durch die
Historische Komission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1962-), 2:594-96; English
trans. Oscar Thulin, A Life of Luther, (Philadelphia, Penn.:
Fortress, 1966), 66: "You know that I am descended from
the most Christian emperors of the noble German nation, from
the Catholic kings of Spain, the archdukes of Austria and
the dukes of Burgundy. . . . I am determined to support everything
that these predecessors and I myself have kept. . . . For
it is certain that a single friar errs in his opinion which
is against all of Christendom and according to which all of
Christianity will be and will always have been in error both
in the past thousand years and even more in the present. For
that reason, I am absolutely determined to stake on this cause
my kingdoms and seigniories, my friends my body and blood,
my life and soul," and Deutsche Reichstagsakten, 2:645;
English trans. De Lemar Jenson, Confrontation at Worms: Martin
Luther and the Diet of Worms, (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young
University Press, 1973), 101: "For this reason, we forbid
anyone from this time forward to dare, either by words or
deeds, to receive, defend, sustain, or favor the said Martin
Luther. On the contrary, we want him to be apprehended and
punished as a notorious heretic, as he deserves."
61. Genesis 49:10, LW 8:239, WA 44:758.
62. I believe that John Witte, Jr. has demonstrated with particular
clarity and precision that the real development of the cura
religionis can best be seen not among the theologians but
among the jurists. See his Law and Protestantism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000); see especially chapter
1 where he lays out the ways in which the jurists move beyond
and expand upon Luther.
63. Two events can serve here as examples. First in 1526,
Luther refused to endorse Philip of Hesse's Reformatio ecclesiarum
Hassiae written by Lambert of Avignon at Philip's behest.
Even though the Reformatio sought to enact many evangelical
positions, Luther rejected it and urged Philip not to enforce
it because of coercive measures involved in it. (See D. Martin
Luthers Werke: Briefwechsel, 15 vols. (Wiemar: Bohlau, 1930),
3:157-58 (hereafter WA Br). The second episode is from 1543,
here Luther objected to Maurice of Saxony's excommunication
order because secular authorities were called upon to implement
the order. (See WA Br, 10:436). | David M. Whitford is an
associate professor of Philosopy and Religion at Claflin University.
 |
 |
|
|
